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Given the importance of sound advice in retail financial markets and the fact that financial institutions
outsource their advice services, what legal rules maximize social welfare in the market? We address
this question by posing a theoretical model of retail markets in which a firm and a broker face a bilateral
hidden action problem when they service clients in the market. All participants in the market are rational,
and prices are set based on consistent beliefs about equilibrium actions of the firm and the broker.
We characterize the optimal law within our modeling context, and derive how the legal system splits
the blame between parties to the transaction. We also analyze how complexity in assessing clients
and conflicts of interest affect the law. Since these markets are large, the implications of the analysis
have great welfare import.
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Retail ﬁnancial markets are unique in that the majority of consumers who participate have an
incomplete understanding of the products that are available and are generally uninformed about
prices in the industry (e.g., NASD Literacy Survey, 2003). In fact, in the language of the Securities
Act of 1933, public investors are described as those who are “unable to fend for themselves.”
Participation at the household level, therefore, not only involves having access to good quality
opportunities, but also entails being directed toward the best alternatives.
There is no clear evidence that advice increases welfare, however (e.g., Bergstresser, Chalmers
and Tufano, 2007). As argued by Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2007) and Carlin (2008), this
may be due to conﬂicts of interest and is likely to be a signiﬁcant cause of decreased faith in the
market (e.g., American subprime mortgage crisis). Given the large size of retail markets, protecting
consumers who are “unable to fend for themselves” is not only an important duty of the law, but
also a key driver of participation in the market and economic growth. Strikingly, though, there has
been a paucity of academic work studying optimal regulation in such markets, especially from a
theoretical perspective.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical analysis of consumer protection laws and address the
following questions: Who should be held accountable when consumers are wronged in ﬁnancial
markets? How does the diﬃculty in assessing a consumer’s needs aﬀect the penalties that are
imposed on the ﬁrm and its representatives? How may the law circumvent conﬂicts of interest
when they arise?
Two stylized facts about retail ﬁnancial markets make addressing these questions interesting
and challenging. First, ﬁnancial institutions frequently outsource their advice services to brokers.
Indeed, the majority of ﬁnancial products are sold through intermediaries. For example, only 10%
of mutual funds are purchased directly from ﬁnancial institutions (Investment Company Institute
July 2003). This means that when a household investor is wronged in the market, two parties are
potentially culpable: the producer and a representative of the ﬁrm (e.g., an advisor or broker).
Thus, any law that is implemented must take into account the potential actions of the producer
of the product itself (e.g., quality and transparency choices), the actions of the advisors in placing
clients into those instruments (e.g., irresponsible advice), and the contractual agreements that are
present between these parties.
The second stylized fact is that assigning blame to either party is an imperfect process. Advisors
can make honest mistakes when assessing the needs of clients. Indeed, despite their good intentions,
1it may be diﬃcult for them to match consumers with ﬁnancial products. Further, based on the
ex post realization that a consumer has been wronged, it is often diﬃcult for the law to identify
where the process failed.1 Therefore, the legal system not only serves to realign the incentives of
producers and advisors, but must also correctly split blame across all parties in order to be eﬀective
ex ante. In doing so, the legal system must anticipate and take into account the eﬀect that a law
will have on the contractual incentives and prices that will prevail in equilibrium for the industry.
The model that we analyze proceeds as follows. A single ﬁrm produces ﬁnancial products and
distributes them to the public through a broker who provides advice service to potential clients.
The ﬁrm has a responsibility to provide good quality opportunities for clients, and higher quality
increases the chances that consumers beneﬁt from making a purchase. The broker’s job is to sort
clients and make recommendations based on a noisy signal about their type. We consider two
kinds of recommendations: advice about whether to participate in the market and advice about
how to participate in the market (i.e., product recommendations). How the ﬁrm and the broker
fulﬁll these responsibilities is unobservable and non-veriﬁable, and so market participants face the
coordination problems that arise in settings with bilateral hidden action.2
The government sets a law that holds the ﬁrm and the broker responsible when a consumer
is wronged. This may occur if a consumer is incorrectly advised to participate in the market or
if the consumer is directed to inappropriate choices when they make a purchase. For example,
the former might occur when an individual purchases a house and enters into a mortgage when
they do not have the income to support the loan. The second might occur when the consumer is
directed towards an adjustable rate mortgage as opposed to a ﬁxed rate instrument (i.e., the wrong
product). In the model, the penalty that the law dictates is set optimally based on the incentives
that the ﬁrm and the broker are anticipated to have when choosing their optimal strategies. As
such, prices in the market arise from consumers’ rational expectations about the optimal actions of
the ﬁrm and the broker, the law that is set to protect their interests, and their expectations about
their own type.
In equilibrium, in the absence of penalties (i.e., the absence of law), neither the ﬁrm nor the
broker can commit to provide quality or advice. Since consumers are rational, prices drop, and
minimal economic surplus is realized. This motivates further analysis regarding consumer protection
law.
When the legal system imposes penalties, the ﬁrm improves the quality of its products and the
1It may even be diﬃcult for the law to determine whether or not a customer was wronged to begin with, as the
performance risk of the product may lead to bad outcomes even for customers who are ﬁt for it ex ante.
2Similar settings of bilateral moral hazard are identiﬁed and discussed by Levmore (1993).
2broker provides more thorough advice. At the same time, however, the broker and the ﬁrm have
a tendency to free-ride on each other’s eﬀort provision. Increasing penalties (blame) to each party
not only increases their own eﬀort provision, but also decreases their counterparty’s incentives to
oﬀer better services. For example, as penalties induce the ﬁrm to oﬀer higher quality products, the
marginal beneﬁt of providing advice decreases. Likewise, the broker’s decision to oﬀer more advice
decreases the number of sales made in the market, and lowers the marginal beneﬁt for the ﬁrm to
invest in oﬀering quality. The law must then consider not only the direct eﬀect that penalties have
on the ﬁrm’s or broker’s actions, but also the indirect eﬀect they have because of free-riding.
In equilibrium, the law is set to maximize total welfare in the market. We show that the total
penalty imposed not only makes a wronged consumer whole, but awards them punitive damages.
This holds for laws governing inappropriate participation in the market, as well as for those gov-
erning poor product choice. The result implies that insurance alone does not maximize welfare in
the market. That is, a law that makes a wronged consumer whole, but does not punish the ﬁrm or
broker further, does not achieve ﬁrst-best quality and advice.
The diﬃculty that a broker experiences in assessing his clients’ needs not only impacts the
optimal actions of the ﬁrm and the broker, but also aﬀects the law. We model this diﬃculty as a
tendency for the broker to make advising errors. As the probability of making such errors increases,
the broker has a lower incentive to give advice. This arises because the marginal beneﬁt of doing so
drops and the broker is more willing to take his chances by selling products to all-comers (as opposed
to sorting them). In contrast, as the probability of errors rises, the ﬁrm has a greater incentive to
provide quality because higher quality increases the chances that consumers are properly served.
The eﬀect that such errors has on the law is to penalize the broker more when assessment is more
precise. Indeed, if sorting consumers were an easy task, this would make it more likely to be the
broker’s fault when a consumer is wronged in the market. Likewise, if sorting consumers is more
diﬃcult, the law places more relative burden on the ﬁrm to produce quality in the ﬁrst place.
For most of the analysis, we assume that consumers cannot circumvent the broker and ignore
their advice. We extend our analysis to relax this assumption and consider the law when the
broker does not act as a gate-keeper per se. In that case, the law cannot achieve the same ﬁrst-
best outcome by including punitive damages, since such payoﬀs would cause the value of advice
to deteriorate. The legal rules that maximize welfare involve an insurance-type remuneration in
which a wronged consumer is made whole, but is not entitled to other damages. The law splits this
obligation between the ﬁrm and the broker, based on the other parameters in the market.
Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the presence of conﬂicts of interest in the market.
3Speciﬁcally, we analyze how sales commissions aﬀect the law that is set and the optimal actions of
the ﬁrm and the broker. We show that sales commissions cause advice to drop, but induce the ﬁrm
to produce more quality. The time and eﬀort spent by the broker in his advising function has the
negative eﬀect of excluding some consumers from buying the ﬁrm’s products. In the presence of
commissions, the agent has an incentive to sell more and thus to be negligent in his advising role.
Anticipating this, the ﬁrm chooses higher quality to avoid the penalties that are associated with
such wrongdoing. The legal rules that maximize welfare in this setting involve higher penalties for
the broker and lower ones for the ﬁrm, which helps to circumvent this conﬂict of interest. This
result is consistent with the case law that deals with conﬂicts of interest and ﬁnancial intermediaries
(e.g., Kumpan and Leyens, 2008).
The analysis in this paper, while of general economic interest, applies more speciﬁcally to retail
ﬁnancial markets because of two unique features in this setting. First, because ﬁnancial products
are inherently risky, it is diﬃcult to measure their ex ante suitability based on ex post outcomes.
As a result, it is generally implausible to oﬀer warranties on such products, as warranties that
protect against performance create easy ex post arbitrage opportunities for buyers. For example,
granting a free option to return a portfolio would clearly create insurmountable adverse selection
problems, and would make the ﬁrm vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by buyers disappointed by
the portfolio’s performance. Moreover, perfect protection and competitive pricing would essentially
transform the portfolio into a risk-free security, making it a redundant investment vehicle. Thus,
whereas Spence (1977), Grossman (1981), and Mann and Wissink (1990) suggest that warranties
and refunds can increase the surplus generated by transactions, commitment to quality via such
mechanisms is next to impossible in retail ﬁnancial markets. Instead we expect the legal system to
play a more signiﬁcant role in these markets, as is the case in Palfrey and Romer’s (1983) analysis
of disputes over product performance between buyers and sellers.
The second feature is that reputation concerns are also unable to induce full commitment to
quality or advice, as proposed by Klein and Leﬄer (1981), Shapiro (1982, 1983) and Allen (1984).
The reason is that products and prices in these markets are inherently diﬃcult for consumers
to decipher. As a result, consumers often settle on a suboptimal product, as documented by
Capon, Fitzsimmons and Prince (1996), Agnew and Szykman (2005), and Choi, Laibson and
Madrian (2006), among many others.3 Moreover, as shown by Ausubel (1991), Jain and Wu (2000),
3Other relevant papers include Alexander, Jones and Nigro (1998), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Wilcox (2003), Barber,
Odean and Zheng (2005), and Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2005). Also note that there exists extensive evidence of
signiﬁcant pricing eﬀects in the market (Ausubel, 1991; Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown, 1999; Baye and
Morgan, 2001; Brown and Goolsbee, 2002; Christoﬀersen and Musto, 2002; Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004; Green,
4Jones and Smythe (2003), and Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2004) in diﬀerent contexts, these con-
sumers are frequently unable to discriminate among brokers and providers of services, due to various
constraints on their discovery processes (e.g., ability or cost to learn). Finally, the low frequency
with which the average consumer interacts with a ﬁnancial product provider seriously limits the
eﬃciency of reputation-building as a disciplining device, especially when the transactions and ex-
periences of other market participants are not publicly observable.4
As such, our paper contributes to a growing theoretical literature on household ﬁnance (e.g.,
Carlin, 2008), the work on law and ﬁnance (e.g., Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002), and the legal
foundations of agency law (e.g., Rasmusen, 2004). We highlight this contribution in the next section
that reviews the related literature. Following that, we set up our benchmark model in Section 3,
and consider the legal system when brokers advise clients as to whether or not to participate in the
market. We start by analyzing the strategic choices of the ﬁrms and the brokers, and then derive
and characterize the legal rules that the government sets in order to maximize welfare. We ﬁnish
the section by analyzing an extension in which the broker is compensated with sales commissions.
In Section 4, we consider the law that prevails when the advisors job is to help their clients choose
the right product, given that they have already decided to participate. In Section 5, we relax the
assumption that the broker acts as a gate-keeper in the market and compare our results to those
derived in previous sections. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks. The Appendix contains all
the proofs.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the theoretical literature on household ﬁnance, in which rational ﬁnancial
institutions interact with heterogeneous consumers who rationally participate in the market, but
must make decisions based on a constrained learning process.5 Whereas consumers are assumed to
have incomplete knowledge about prices in the market in Carlin (2008) and about the quality of
products in Carlin and Manso (2008), we assume instead that consumers have limited information
about the appropriateness of a speciﬁc ﬁnancial product for their own situation. In this context,
consumers not only beneﬁt from a higher commitment to quality by the ﬁrm, but also from the
2007; Green, Holliﬁeld and Sch¨ urhoﬀ, 2007), and that this has substantial welfare impact (e.g., Campbell, 2006;
Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2006).
4In fact, it could be argued that a legal system is necessary for reputation to form in these markets. That is, given
poor access to information, the presence of law suits acts as a device for reputation to form and get disseminated in
the population. We leave this additional role for the legal system to future research.
5This literature has evolved from the initial insight of Stigler (1961) about price dispersion and the subsequent
consumer models of Shilony (1977), Varian (1980), and Burdett and Judd (1983).
5advice of the agent hired by the ﬁrm to match products and customers. As in Kronman’s (1978)
discussion of voluntary disclosures and in Shavell’s (1994) model of the same problem, the presence
of legal obligations changes the agent’s incentives to gather and communicate information that is
socially useful. Our analysis adds the aforementioned tensions between the ﬁrm and the agent to
this problem, characterizes their contractual relationship, and derives the regulation that maximizes
economic welfare.6
Our paper also adds to the literature on law and ﬁnance, which highlights the link between strong
legal and ﬁnancial institutions and economic growth. For example, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)
analyze the eﬀects that legal protection has on the type and quality of investments that occur in
the market. Similarly, Stulz (2008) shows how strong securities laws that mandate disclosures can
signiﬁcantly impact ﬁrms’ access to capital and their value, as suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2006). This work underscores several empirical observations that there is a
strong relationship between legal institutions and economic progress. Indeed, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) document substantial cross-sectional variation in the
legal protection that investors receive in diﬀerent countries, and posit that there exists a positive
correlation between government regulation and economic growth. Following them, Levine (1999),
Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), and Beck, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (2005) also argue for
this positive relationship. In a similar vein, Levine (1998), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), and
Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2008) provide evidence that ﬁnancial intermediation and the provision
of credit are greatly aﬀected by the legal system, while Nunn (2007) shows that the ability of a
legal system to enforce contracts is a signiﬁcant driver of economic activity.7 Consistent with these
empirical observations, the analysis in this paper demonstrates that consumer protection law is
necessary for both the preservation and the prosperity of retail ﬁnancial markets. In this sense, our
work complements that of Acemoglu, Antr` as and Helpman (2007) who show that strong contract
enforcement facilitate the adoption of more advanced technology.
The paper may also be viewed as an economic analysis of agency law (e.g., Rasmusen, 2004).
Indeed, following Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Holmstr¨ om (1979), economists
have focused their study of agency theory on the search for contractual arrangements that realign
the incentives of agents with those of the principal, thereby maximizing the production potential
and value of the ﬁrm. In contrast, and as laid out by Sykes (1984, 1988), the primary objective
6We ignore the closely related concept of ﬁduciary duty, which includes but is not restricted to the agent’s
responsibility to report his information truthfully to customers. For an economic perspective of ﬁduciary duty, see
Hart (1993).
7For a comprehensive overview of the literature on law and economic growth, see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer (2008).
6of legal scholars studying agency law is to determine who is to blame (principal or agent, or both)
when an outsider is wronged. As Rasmusen (2004) writes, “for the economist, the agency problem
is how to give the agent incentives for the right action; for the lawyer, it is how to ‘mop up’ the
damage once the agent has taken the wrong action” (page 370). In this paper, we analyze the
interaction of these forces, that is, where the law must take into account incentives within the
ﬁrm when it assigns blame. To our knowledge, this interaction has not been analyzed or modeled
before.8
Finally, our paper is probably closest in spirit to recent discussion papers by Barr, Mullainathan
and Shaﬁr (2008) and by Lipner and Catalano (2008) about the regulation of home mortgage credit
and negligent investment advice respectively. Like us, Barr, Mullainathan and Shaﬁr argue that
the complexity of the decisions that consumers are asked to make about mortgages requires a
legal system that properly internalizes the incentives, motives and biases of market participants.
Similarly, Lipner and Catalano advocate a system of legal responsibility that ﬁlls the gaps in existing
securities statute and holds brokers and advisors accountable for “negligent misrepresentation.”
Our paper complements these papers by providing an economic analysis that formalizes the main
ideas, explicitly characterizes the economic forces, and extends their applicability to the entirety of
retail ﬁnancial markets.
3 A Market for Financial Services and Advice
3.1 Model Setup
Consider a risk-neutral ﬁnancial institution (i.e., a ﬁrm, or a principal) that markets an investment
product to a unit mass of consumers. Consumers may be of two types: either they are a “high”
type (H) in which case they are well-suited for this class of product (say, a particular class of mutual
funds) or they are a “low” type (L) in which case they are not. High types derive a positive money-
equivalent value of m from owning the product, whereas low types suﬀer a money-equivalent loss of
−m. That is, a high type would be willing to pay as much as m to acquire the product, while a low
type would be willing to pay as much as m to avoid or get rid of the product. Ex ante, consumers
8Hiriart and Martimort (2006) study a regulation problem in which the legal system must anticipate the ﬁrm’s
incentives to undertake environmentally risky activities. The similarity between our problem and theirs is limited
to this anticipatory component and the fact that blame is ultimately shared by the ﬁrm and its agent. Indeed, the
market, the product, the game between the ﬁrm and its agent, and the presence of utility-maximizing consumers are
all speciﬁc to our setting.




L, prob. 1 − φ.
(1)
As such, φ may be considered an ex ante measure of the scope of the product for the consumer pop-
ulation. Products with low φ are more specialized, whereas products with higher φ have widespread
use. Consumers have consistent beliefs about the market, and we set φm − (1 − φ)m = 0 so that
without any other information (e.g., advice), consumers are not willing to pay anything for the
product.9
When the ﬁrm produces the good, it chooses a quality q ∈ [0,1], incurring a cost of kF
2 q2 in doing
so. Higher quality enhances the scope for the product and makes it more likely that consumers
derive m. Speciﬁcally, in addition to the fraction φ of consumers who are a natural ﬁt for the
product, an additional fraction q of the remaining consumers will also derive positive value. This
quality choice captures the idea that ﬁrms can enhance the market for their products by improving
their performance. This might involve minimizing the transaction costs that a fund incurs during
its operation (e.g., minimizing turnover), eﬃciently rebalancing a portfolio in response to changing
market conditions, limiting the opportunities for employees to steal value from clients (e.g., impose
internal monitoring to minimize private beneﬁts), or ﬁnding the best traders to oversee assets
under management. For example, it may be inappropriate for a certain proportion of consumers
to invest in a particular growth fund because of the risk involved. However, the ﬁrm can make the
fund a worthwhile investment for a larger fraction of consumers by allocating resources to lower
transaction costs and by minimizing turnover, as this boosts the net expected return of the fund
and improves its risk-return proﬁle. Of course, some of the remaining consumers might still be
better oﬀ investing in an alternative investment vehicle. Similarly, some customers may be better
oﬀ not purchasing a house with an adjustable-rate mortgage, but the ﬁrm can improve the terms
of the mortgage contract in such a way that fewer innocent consumers end up with an investment
they cannot aﬀord.
Sales in the market are intermediated by a risk-neutral broker (i.e., an agent). The broker
distributes the product and receives a wage w from the ﬁrm for providing this service.10,11 As
9We could normalize φm−(1−φ)m to any constant without aﬀecting our results. This particular parametrization
eliminates corner solutions that come with uninteresting properties (e.g., negative ﬁrm proﬁts).
10We assume that the broker attracts clients costlessly through referrals from the ﬁrm. Thus, we do not model the
moral hazard problem associated with the eﬀort required to attract consumers. This problem is analyzed by Inderst
and Ottaviani (2008), and Inderst (2008).
11In Section 3.4, we consider an alternative contract in which the ﬁrm compensates the broker with sales com-
missions. As will become apparent there, even though such incentives are necessary for the broker to distribute the
8such, there is a division of labor in which the principal of the ﬁrm is responsible for producing the
good, while the broker is responsible for providing potential clients with ﬁnancial advice. More
speciﬁcally, the broker’s role is to prevent low-type consumers from purchasing the product. The
broker chooses a level of advice a ∈ [0,1] and incurs a cost of
kA
2 a2 in doing so. If a = 0, the
agent does not gather any information about any customer, and so cannot provide them with any
useful advice. If a = 1, the agent responsibly sorts customers based on his (possibly imperfect)
information about their needs for the product. For any choice of a ∈ (0,1), the agent provides
valuable advice to a proportion a of the investor population and sells without reservation to the
other fraction 1−a. That is, the broker gathers information about types for a customers and, based
on this information, some of these customers are turned away, receiving a payoﬀ of zero.12 All the
other customers purchase the product (and it will be optimal for them to do so in equilibrium).
When the agent gives advice, we assume that he may make mistakes despite his good intentions
to accurately sort consumers. Speciﬁcally, for each consumer that the agent advises, he receives a
signal ˜ s = ˜ ǫ˜ τ + (1 − ˜ ǫ)˜ η. The variable ˜ η is noise that has the same distribution as ˜ τ, but whose




0, prob. 1 − γ,
(2)
where γ ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, if ˜ ǫ = 1 the agent observes a signal that conveys the consumer’s true
type, whereas if ˜ ǫ = 0 the agent receives a noisy signal which is equivalent to having no added
information about the consumer’s type. However, because the realization of ˜ ǫ is unobservable, the
agent never knows whether he is in possession of ˜ τ or not. Thus the parameter γ captures the idea
that some ﬁnancial decisions are complicated and, despite the agent’s goodwill, errors do occur.
When γ = 1, the agent always observes the consumers’ types with perfect precision. However, when
γ = 0, eﬀort in giving advice does not improve the chances that consumers are sorted appropriately.
We can also think of 1−γ as the diﬃculty of the agent’s task. For example, ﬁnancial products that
are especially diﬃcult to match with consumers are characterized by a low γ. In what follows, we
will see that γ not only plays an important role when we analyze the optimal actions of the ﬁrm
and the broker, but also when we derive the optimal law.
Because the customers who are not turned away do not know whether the broker has positive
or no information about them, they are all equally eager to buy the product for some price p that
product, sales commissions induce a conﬂict of interest, which we characterize in detail. For now, we ignore this
source of moral hazard and focus on the broker’s tendency to give advice.
12We implicitly assume here that the advisor acts as a gate-keeper and consumers have no other choice but to heed
their recommendation. Therefore, they cannot bypass the advisor. We relax this assumption in Section 5.
9does not exceed their expected payoﬀ from the product. In equilibrium, this price depends on the
consumers’ consistent beliefs about the equilibrium actions of the ﬁrm and the broker, as well as
their bargaining power.13 Hence, prices in the market arise from the fully rational behavior of all
parties to the transaction.
By construction in this model, the broker and the ﬁrm cannot directly observe each other’s
actions when making their optimal choices of a and q. The resulting model is one of bilateral
hidden action in which both parties are rational and have consistent beliefs about each other’s
equilibrium behavior. The agent’s advice helps to match the investors’ needs with the correct
instrument, but the agent is unable to advise consumers about how funds are managed internally
within the ﬁrm. Likewise, the ﬁrm chooses how much resources it expends to add quality to its
investment products or services, but cannot oversee the advice that consumers receive when they
purchase the product.
Finally, the legal environment is set as follows. The government chooses a law that protects
consumers if they purchase a product they should not have purchased and suﬀer a loss.14 We
assume that the legal system is set to maximize total welfare in the market. As such, the law
L = {ρA,ρF} is the ﬁnancial burden imposed on the two parties who are responsible for marketing
and selling the ﬁnancial product or service to a consumer: ρA is paid by the broker and ρF is paid
by the ﬁrm.15 Therefore, for each consumer who suﬀers a loss m after purchasing the product,
ρT = ρA +ρF is the total value recovered via the legal system. If ρT = m+m, the consumer is said
to be made “whole” by the law. If ρT > m + m, the consumer is not only made whole, but is also
entitled to additional punitive damages.
Note that we deliberately assume that penalties are not aﬀected by the number of consumers
who end up suing. Two considerations drive this assumption. First, by making each customer’s
penalty independent from the penalties of others, we capture the idea that in reality transactions
for ﬁnancial products and the lawsuits that results from them do not all occur at the same time, as
they do in the model. Instead, each consumer can appeal to the court system if and when they are
wronged, regardless of what is likely to happen to others down the road. In fact, in this light, our
assumption is consistent with that of Inderst and Ottaviani (2008) who consider only one consumer.
13For some of our analysis, it will be convenient to assume that the ﬁrm is a monopolist that extracts all consumer
surplus, but our results do not depend on this particular split of bargaining power.
14We assume that customers’ types can be veriﬁed perfectly in a court of law. This is without loss of generality as,
in our setting, imperfect veriﬁcation could be easily overcome by appropriately scaled penalties.
15Alternatively, the parameters ρA and ρF could also be interpreted as expected penalties given the probability
that a lawsuit is successful and the damages awarded by the law. For example, it might be that ρA = zpA where z
is the probability that any lawsuit succeeds and pA is the payment to the consumer when it does succeed.
10Indeed, given that the ﬁrm and agent are risk-neutral, a and q then determine the probability that
this one consumer buys the product and the probability that he sues, without aﬀecting the analysis.
Second, as we show in Section 3.3, treating each customer independently is suﬃcient for the legal
system to recover ﬁrst-best when customers are obliged to follow the broker’s recommendations.
3.2 Equilibrium Behavior
We begin by calculating the number of sales that are made by the broker and the fraction of
consumers who seek remedies because they were wronged in the transaction. We then characterize
the equilibrium actions of the ﬁrm and the broker. An analysis of the law is contained in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Equilibrium Sales and Potential Lawsuits
The number of sales made by the ﬁrm depends on the agent’s equilibrium choice of advice and the
ex ante scope of the product φ. Since 1 − a of the consumers purchase without being sorted and a
fraction Pr{˜ s = L} = 1 − φ of the a consumers advised are deemed not right for the product and
steered away from buying, the total number of sales (nS) in this market is
nS = aPr{˜ s = H} + (1 − a) = aφ + (1 − a) = 1 − a(1 − φ). (3)
By inspection, the total number of sales is increasing in φ, which is not surprising since sales should
increase when the scope for the product is higher. Total sales are decreasing in a since the goal
of advice is to prevent low types from buying. Deﬁne nH (nL) as the number of high (low) types
that purchase the product. As such, nH is an important source of positive welfare in the market
since these are the consumers who gain value from the product. Equally important, though, nL not
only represents the fraction of consumers who suﬀer losses, but also measures the fraction who seek
remedies through the law. The quantity ρTnL, which represents the total amount of penalties paid
to wronged customers, thus provides a good measure of the size of the legal system. The following
proposition computes and characterizes nH and nL.




1 − a(1 − φ)(1 − γ)
￿




1 − φ(1 − γ)
￿o
, (4)




1 − φ(1 − γ)
￿o
. (5)
The number of high types is increasing in q, but decreasing in a, whereas the number of low types
is decreasing in both q and a.
11According to Proposition 1, as the ﬁrm increases scope for the product (increases quality) while
the broker keeps his advising constant, fewer consumers are wronged since the product becomes a
match for a larger fraction of consumers. Similarly, as advice in the market increases (keeping q
constant), nL decreases because more consumers who would suﬀer losses are correctly directed to
exit the market. However, advice does have the side eﬀect of decreasing nH as well. This arises
because the broker cannot tell with perfect precision who is right for the product. As such, with
some probability he may eliminate consumers from the market who would otherwise have beneﬁtted
from making the purchase.
3.2.2 Optimal Broker and Firm Behavior
We begin by considering the optimal behavior of the broker, and restrict kF > m
φγ and kA > mφγ
in what follows.16 The broker is paid a wage w for distributing the product to clients and incurs a
cost of
kA
2 a2 for giving advice a.17 The broker therefore solves
max
a∈[0,1]





















(1 − q)(1 − φ)λρA
kA
, (7)
where λ ≡ 1 − φ(1 − γ).
By inspection of (7), the higher the penalties imposed by the law, the higher the advice that is
given in the market. Interestingly, though, the higher the quality of the product, the less advising
the broker chooses to do. This occurs because the marginal beneﬁt to advice decreases due the
fact that clients are more likely to gain positive value from their purchase. This implies a natural
tendency for the broker to free-ride on the eﬀort provision of the ﬁrm. For lower levels of γ, the
broker also tends to advise less. When consumers are diﬃcult to sort, the broker will “take his
chances” and sell without reservation to save on the eﬀort cost of advising clients.
16This assumption is made purely for technical convenience. It guarantees an internal solution to both the ﬁrm’s
and the broker’s problems. This assumption is suﬃcient, but not necessary for internal solutions to exist. Avoiding
corner solutions is for expositional clarity, but does not qualitatively change the results that follow.
17As mentioned above, we analyze sales commissions and the incentives they create in section 3.4.


























q2 − w. (8)
First-order conditions yield
q =
(1 − φ)(1 − aλ)ρF
kF
. (9)
As such, the optimal quality choice of the ﬁrm is increasing in ρF and is decreasing in a and γ.
As the amount of advice rises, there is a natural tendency for the ﬁrm to free-ride on the eﬀort
provision of the agent. Likewise, as the tendency for the broker to make errors decreases (i.e., as γ
increases), the marginal beneﬁt of quality for the ﬁrm decreases, as it can rely more heavily on the
agent to match customers and products and thereby to reduce the ﬁrm’s expected liabilities. Thus,
as in the moral-hazard-in-teams problem of Holmstr¨ om (1982), the ﬁrm and the agent free-ride on
each other when they make their unobservable choices of quality and advice. Because this free-rider
problem is aﬀected by the diﬃculty of the agent’s task, the equilibrium degree of moral hazard that
customers can expect also depends on γ.
Of course, in (7) and (9), a and q are expressed in terms of the other parties’ optimal choice. In
the following proposition, we solve for a∗ and q∗, the broker’s and ﬁrm’s optimal choices in terms
of the primitives of the model.




kF − (1 − φ)ρF
￿
kAkF − (1 − φ)2λ2ρAρF
, (10)




kA − (1 − φ)λ2ρA
￿
kAkF − (1 − φ)2λ2ρAρF
. (11)
The ﬁrm’s optimal choice of quality q∗ is increasing in ρF and decreasing in ρA, whereas the broker’s
choice of advice a∗ is increasing in ρA and decreasing in ρF.
According to Proposition 2, the more the law holds the ﬁrm liable for the consumers’ misfortune,
the higher the tendency for the ﬁrm to add more quality to their product. Likewise, the more the
18This price will be further discussed later.
13law penalizes the broker when a consumer is wronged, the higher eﬀort the broker employs in giving
sound advice. This has an important eﬀect given the tendency for free-riding among the parties.
That is, higher penalties for the ﬁrm will cause q∗ to rise, which will make advice less likely. In the
same way, raising ρA causes advice to increase, but leads to a lower quality in the market. Each
party takes into account the penalties imposed on the other when they make their optimal choices.
This will have important implications for the optimal law, which we consider next.
3.3 Investor Protection
We now analyze consumer protection law in this market. We begin by showing that without the
law, the sale of ﬁnancial products does not enhance welfare in the market: quality and advice are
zero. Following this discussion, we derive and characterize the legal rules that maximize welfare in
the market.
Since prices, wages, and penalties are transfers among market participants, total welfare reduces
to the value that consumers gain minus the losses that wronged consumers suﬀer minus the costs
of quality and advice.19 Therefore, since the government seeks to maximize welfare, it sets the law
by solving the following problem:
max
ρA,ρF







As discussed in Section 3.2, ρA and ρF aﬀect the ﬁrm’s choice of q and the broker’s choice of a, and
therefore impact the quantities nH and nL.
Suppose indeed that no law exists, so that ρA = 0 and ρF = 0. From (10) and (11), we have
q∗ = 0 and a∗ = 0. This implies that the ﬁrm and the agent cannot commit to provide quality
service to clients in the absence of external incentives to do so. In other words, if customers expect
any q or a above zero, it is always optimal for the ﬁrm and agent to provide them with less than
that, as their choices are unobservable. Anticipating this problem, clients are unwilling to pay
positive prices for the product, as the ex ante surplus they derive from it is φm − (1 − φ)m = 0.
Thus the market is fully aﬀected by the lemons problem that consumers face and, as a result, the
ﬁrm’s value and total welfare are both zero. The following proposition formalizes this ﬁnding.
Proposition 3. (Absence of Law) Suppose that L = {ρA,ρF}. Then, q∗ = a∗ = 0 and W = 0.
There are two reasons why retail ﬁnancial markets depend so critically on the law for both
preservation and prosperity. The ﬁrst reason rests on the fact that ﬁnancial products and services
19As such, maximizing total welfare in the market does not depend on which party has market power. Whether
the ﬁrm is a monopolist or there is perfect competition, the optimal law remains the same.
14cannot be sold with warranties. For example, it is implausible for a ﬁrm to commit to a return
policy on a portfolio without charging a positive price for such a guarantee. A “free” insurance
policy like this would clearly create arbitrage opportunities and would make the ﬁrm vulnerable
to opportunistic behavior by consumers. Therefore, in the absence of such warranties, the law
becomes necessary to prevent market breakdown.20,21
The second reason why the law may be necessary is if the social structure and the ability to form
public trust in the market is suﬃciently challenging without the law. Indeed, as Carlin, Dorobantu,
and Viswanathan (2008) show, if the value of social capital and the potential for productivity are
suﬃciently high, the law may be superﬂuous and even value destroying. However, in most cases
when the market cannot depend on these other forces, some investor protection through the law
enhances welfare. Economic growth and prosperity may require legal institutions that allow ﬁrms
to credibly signal the quality of their products (e.g., Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer, 2001).
Proposition 3 therefore motivates an analysis of the law, as without government, the presence
of the market leaves total welfare unaﬀected. The following proposition characterizes the law.
Proposition 4. The law L∗ = {ρ∗
A,ρ∗
F} is given by
ρ∗






kA(kF − m) − (1 − φ)λm2￿. (14)
The penalty ρ∗
A is strictly increasing in γ.





kAkF − λ2m2 , (15)
q∗ =
(kA − φγλm)m
kAkF − λ2m2 . (16)
By inspection of (14), ρ∗
A > 0 given the condition that kF > m
φγ. Since ρ∗
F = m+m, this implies
that when a consumer sues for damages, they capture ρ∗
A + ρ∗
F > m + m. So, not only are they
made whole through the suit, they are awarded punitive damages for their troubles. Therefore,
we observe that when the legal system seeks to optimize welfare in the market, they set a penalty
scheme that includes punitive damages.
20As we will show shortly, providing insurance policies that make consumers whole if they are wronged does not
achieve ﬁrst-best anyway. Rather, the optimal law must include punitive damages as well.
21In this one-period model, we implicitly ignore reputation eﬀects that refunds and other warranties could have
on subsequent buyers. Such eﬀects would clearly complement the legal issues discussed here. Note however that
reputation forces depend heavily on the public observability of wrong-doing and refunds, which may themselves
require the presence of a legal system.
15This implies several things about retail ﬁnancial markets. First, insurance alone is unlikely to
maximize welfare. That is, a promise to make consumers whole when they are wronged (i.e., a
promise to oﬀer them m + m) does not achieve maximum welfare. Second, consumers who are
wronged achieve a better outcome than consumers who were properly served. We revisit this issue
in Section 5. Finally, according to Proposition 4, as precision in evaluating consumers rises, the
law will make penalties more severe for brokers when a consumer is wronged. This makes intuitive
sense as the higher the precision is, the more likely the broker is at fault, given that a consumer is
wronged.
3.4 Incentives and Conﬂicts of Interest
So far, we have assumed that the advisor is paid a ﬁxed wage w for distributing the product to
consumers. We now consider the possibility for the ﬁrm to compensate the agent based on the
number of sales. More speciﬁcally, suppose that the advisor receives a sales commission of b for
each consumer who makes a purchase. Total compensation in this case is nSb, and the problem
that the broker faces is
max
a∈[0,1]








1 − a(1 − φ)
￿










The following proposition characterizes the optimal choices of the ﬁrm and the advisor, as well as
the law Lb = {ρb
A,ρb
F}.
Proposition 5. (Incentives and the Law) The optimal advice and quality choices by the broker and
the ﬁrm are given by
a∗ = (1 − φ)
￿
(λρA − b)kF − λρAρF]
kAkF − (1 − φ)2λ2ρAρF
￿
, (18)
whereas the optimal amount of advice is
q∗ = (1 − φ)ρF
￿
kA − (1 − φ)λ2(ρA − b)]
kAkF − (1 − φ)2λ2ρAρF
￿
. (19)
The law in the presence of sales commissions Lb = {ρb
A,ρb





According to Proposition 5, incentives cause the optimal amount of advice to decrease and the
optimal choice of quality to increase. Comparing (18) and (19) to (10) and (11) in Section 3.2, we
can see that
ab = aw −
(1 − φ)kFb
kAkF − (1 − φ)2λ2ρAρF
(20)
16and
qb = qw +
(1 − φ)λb
kAkF − (1 − φ)2λ2ρAρF
, (21)
where qj and aj are the quality and advice for each form of compensation j ∈ {b,w}. This implies
that there exists a conﬂict of interest in which the advisor will look the other way when consumers
place purchase orders. So while incentives are clearly required for advisors to distribute the product,
such commissions may indeed make advisors less likely to do so responsibly. Of course, the ﬁrm
takes this into account when it chooses q. When there are conﬂicts of interest, the ﬁrm provides
more quality to protect itself and avoid the penalties that would ensue due to the broker’s careless
recommendations. The government also takes this into account when devising the legal system,
relieving the ﬁrm a bit from responsibility and placing more of the blame on the advisor when
consumers are wronged. This is consistent with the case law that deals with conﬂicts of interest
and ﬁnancial intermediaries (e.g., Kumpan and Leyens, 2008).
4 Advice About Product Selection
So far in our model, the broker’s advice has been limited to a participation decision by customers.
That is, the broker can instruct customers as to whether or not the ﬁrm’s one product is good
for them. In reality, brokers fulﬁll other roles vis-` a-vis the ﬁrm’s clients. One important role is in
providing advice about the choice of product. Indeed, it is often the case that the ﬁrm oﬀers several
products that its clients can choose from, and it is then the broker’s job to match each consumer
with the right product for his speciﬁc situation. For example, a mutual fund family that oﬀers
multiple funds with various risk characteristics will rely on brokers to guide customers towards
the fund that is appropriate for each of them. Similarly, a lender will rely on a mortgage broker
to advise customers in terms of the appropriate instrument to ﬁnance a house purchase (e.g., an
adjustable rate mortgage versus a ﬁxed-rate mortgage). In this section, we modify the model of
section 3 to account for this additional function of brokers. As we show, the results derived so far
still hold, but the new model uncovers a few additional insights in the ﬁrm-broker relationship.
4.1 Model Setup
Suppose that the ﬁrm now markets a continuum of investment products, i ∈ [0,1], to the unit
mass of consumers. Each consumer is naturally well-suited for a subset of measure φ of these
products. More speciﬁcally, consumer types are uniformly distributed on [0,1] and a consumer
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(a) Products and customer type.
0
1














(b) Eﬀect of ﬁrm’s choice of q.
Figure 1: These ﬁgures show the set [0,1] of all the ﬁrm’s products in a circle. Products are labeled
between zero and one as we move counter-clockwise along the circle’s circumference. In ﬁgure (a),
the type τ of a customer determines an interval of products Iτ for which this customer is a natural
match. In ﬁgure (b), this interval is expanded by the ﬁrm’s choice of quality q > 0.
zero in Iτ is remapped to the upper portion of the unit interval; the same customer is a mismatch
for all the other products. To visualize this, we can think of the unit interval of products as the
circumference of a perfect circle, as in Figure 1(a). Each consumer’s type is a point ˜ τ = τ on the
circle’s circumference, with all the point within a distance of
φ
2 from τ representing products that
are a good match for the customer. For example, a consumer with a long run objective could be a
good match for a set of riskier equity funds oﬀered by a fund family. When a customer of type τ is
matched with a product in Iτ, he derives a positive money-equivalent value of m. When mismatched
(i.e., if the product is from [0,1]\Iτ), the same customer suﬀers a money-equivalent loss of −m. As
before, consumers are unaware of their own type ex ante, but do know the distribution of types in
the population as well as the likelihood of being matched with a product. We also keep assuming
that φm − (1 − φ)m = 0 so that without any other information, consumers are willing to pay at
most zero for any of the ﬁrm’s products.
The ﬁrm and the agent play the same bilateral hidden action game as in Section 3. In this case,
the ﬁrm’s choice of q expands the set of products that beneﬁt any one customer. Speciﬁcally, as
shown in Figure 1(b), in addition to the fraction φ of products that are a natural ﬁt for a customer,
an additional fraction q of the remaining products will allow this consumer to derive m. The
broker’s role is now to direct customers to speciﬁc products oﬀered by the ﬁrm, in that his choice of
a determines the fraction of customers for whom his information improves the likelihood of a match.





0, prob. 1 − aγ,
(22)
and the variable ˜ η is noise that, like ˜ τ, is uniformly distributed on [0,1], but whose realization is
independent from ˜ τ. As before, a larger a ∈ [0,1] allows the agent to observe a customer’s true
type more frequently but, when γ is smaller than one, his information can never be perfect.22 Of
course, since ˜ s is more likely to be in I˜ τ than a random draw from a uniform distribution, the
agent’s advice is always to recommend product ˜ s to the consumer.23 Because every product oﬀered
by the ﬁrm is ex ante identical and because of the symmetry of types across potential buyers, all
products sell for the same price, which we still denote by p.
Although we still do not model the agent’s role in attracting customers, we do capture the idea
that the advising function displaces some of the agent’s attention and reduces the ﬂow of potential
customers. More precisely, we assume that the agent’s eﬀort a that is directed towards advising
customers results in a loss of δa in customer ﬂow, where δ ∈ [0,1 − γ). That is, of the initial mass
of customers, only nS = 1 − δa sales are made by the ﬁrm. The other δa customers are assumed
to receive a payoﬀ of zero.24 Finally, the legal environment is exactly as before: the government
chooses a law that allows customers who are mismatched with a product (and suﬀer a loss of m)
to recover ρA and ρF from the agent and ﬁrm respectively.
4.2 Equilibrium and Results
As mentioned above, the number of sales made by the ﬁrm in this new setup depends on the agent’s
equilibrium choice of advice and is given by nS = 1 − δa. Also, it is straightforward to verify that
the fractions of high types and low types who purchase the product are
nH = φ + q(1 − φ) + a
￿
(1 − q)(1 − φ)(γ + δ) − δ
￿
, and (23)
nL = (1 − q)(1 − φ)
￿
1 − a(γ + δ)
￿
. (24)
22To highlight the fact that a fraction a of consumers receive information that increases their posterior probability
of being correctly matched with a ﬁnancial product, one can write the agent’s signal as ˜ s = ˜ ψ
￿
˜ ǫ˜ τ +(1−˜ ǫ)˜ η
￿
+(1− ˜ ψ)˜ η,
where ˜ ψ is equal to 1 with probability a and equal to zero otherwise. The analysis is completely unaﬀected by this
alternative representation of ˜ s.
23As before, we initially assume that consumers have no other choice but to heed the agent’s recommendation.
That is, they cannot select a product that he does not recommend. We relax this assumption in Section 5.
24The same setup endogenously arises if we assume that the agent must also exert eﬀort to attract customers and
that the agent has a limited eﬀort capital. More speciﬁcally, assume that 1 − δ customers come to the ﬁrm if the
agent exerts no eﬀort to attract customers, and that an eﬀort of α ∈ [0,1] increases the ﬂow of customers by δα.
The above setup results if α can be exerted without any eﬀort cost being incurred by the agent and if his total eﬀort
supply, a + α, cannot exceed one. Indeed, the agent then allocates all of his non-advising eﬀort, 1 − a, to attracting
customers for a total customer ﬂow of 1 − δ + δ(1 − a) = 1 − δa.
19As before, an increase in q results in more sales to high types and fewer sales to low types. However,
although an increase in a still lowers the numbers of sales to low types, it is possible for advice to have
a negative side eﬀect and reduce the number of sales to high types. Indeed, when δ >
(1−q)(1−φ)γ
φ+q(1−φ) , the
broker’s eﬀort to sort consumers ends up costing the ﬁrm many sales. So, although the consumers
who buy are better matched, the fact that many of them no longer buy products at all reduces the
total number of consumers who beneﬁt from the ﬁrm’s product oﬀering.
As before, we need to assume that kF and kA are large enough in order to ensure interior
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a =











respectively. It is again the case that the agent and ﬁrm free-ride on each other: the agent’s choice
of advice is decreasing in q, while the ﬁrm’s choice of quality is decreasing in a. It is also the case
that more information precision (i.e., a larger γ) leads the agent to advise more and the ﬁrm to
lower quality. The following result, describing the equilibrium choices of a and q, is the analogue
to Proposition 2.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, the optimal choice of quality is given by
a∗ =
(1 − φ)(γ + δ)
￿
kF − (1 − φ)ρF
￿
ρA
kAkF − (1 − φ)2(γ + δ)2ρAρF
, (27)




kA − (1 − φ)(γ + δ)2ρA
￿
ρF
kAkF − (1 − φ)2(γ + δ)2ρAρF
. (28)
The ﬁrm’s optimal choice of quality q∗ is increasing in ρF and decreasing in ρA, whereas the broker’s
choice of advice a∗ is increasing in ρA and decreasing in ρF.
Clearly, advice and quality are both zero without a legal system (i.e., when ρA = ρF = 0). Also,
as in Proposition 2, a∗ is increasing in ρA and decreasing in ρF, while q∗ is increasing in ρF and
decreasing in ρA. Thus increasing the penalties of one party creates the need to further increase the
penalties of the other party. As a result, the law again requires total penalties to be above m+m,
as shown in the following proposition, the analogue to Proposition 4.
20Proposition 7. The law L∗ = {ρ∗
A,ρ∗
F} is given by
ρ∗





γkF − (γ + δ)m
￿
m
(1 − φ)(γ + δ)
￿
kA(kF − m) − δ(γ + δ)m2￿. (30)
The penalty ρ∗
A is strictly increasing in γ.





γkF − (γ + δ)m
￿
m
kAkF − (γ + δ)2m2 , (31)
q∗ =
￿
kA − γ(γ + δ)m
￿
m
kAkF − (γ + δ)2m2 . (32)
The fact that ρT > m+m in both Propositions 4 and 7 implies that, once a consumer is advised
away from the ﬁrm’s products or towards a speciﬁc ﬁnancial product, he would rather ignore the
advice to gain access to punitive damages. That is, advised consumers prefer the lottery that
comes with unrecommended products. Clearly, the legal system will have the intended eﬀect only
if consumers cannot bypass the broker to purchase their ﬁnancial products; that is, the decision to
enter the transaction and the choice of product is made for them by the broker. In markets where
the advisor cannot act as a gate-keeper, the law derived in Proposition 4 would induce consumers
to ignore advice, and therefore decrease the value generated by advice services. In such markets,
the government must take this possibility into account when setting the law. We address this
consideration carefully in the next section.
5 Heeding Advice and the Law
As pointed out in the previous section, the law is only able to impose severe punitive damages on
the ﬁrm and advisor as long as consumers are not able to circumvent the advice that they receive
from brokers. In this section, we investigate the role of the legal system when brokers cannot act as
gate-keepers. Speciﬁcally, damages cannot be too great, and the expected payoﬀ to heeding advice
must be superior to seeking the lottery-type payoﬀs that we derived previously.
We perform our analysis using the product selection model of Section 4, as this model facilitates
the derivation of closed-form solutions.25 In fact, to make the analysis even more tractable and
our results more intuitive, we assume that the agent’s eﬀort to advise does not reduce the ﬂow of
customers; that is, we assume that δ = 0.
25We have veriﬁed via numerical solutions that the same results also obtain using the model of Section 3.
21Assume that the ﬁrm’s products sell for p. For a consumer to heed advice, it must be that the
payoﬀs to ignoring advice are lower than the payoﬀs of following it. Given the information structure
of Section 4, a customer following the broker’s advice to buy product τ can expect a payoﬀ of m
with probability
Pr{˜ τ ∈ Iτ | ˜ s = τ} = γa + (1 − γa)
￿




φ + (1 − φ)q
￿
+ γa(1 − φ)(1 − q) ≡  1.
This customer’s expected utility from buying product τ is
E[˜ u | ˜ s = τ] =  1m + (1 −  1)(−m + ρA + ρF) − p. (33)
If on the other hand the consumer decides not to follow the broker’s advice and to buy a random
product ˜ t ∈ [0,1], the probability that the product is a match is only
Pr{˜ τ ∈ I˜ t} = φ + (1 − φ)q ≡  0,
and so his expected utility from the transaction is
E[˜ u] =  0m + (1 −  0)(−m + ρA + ρF) − p. (34)
A simple comparison of (33) and (34) establishes that the customer follows the broker’s advice if
and only if
( 1 −  0)m ≥ ( 1 −  0)(−m + ρA + ρF),
or equivalently,
ρA + ρF ≤ m + m. (35)
Thus the penalties set by the government cannot exceed the value that is on the line during the
purchase. The higher the potential beneﬁt to owning the right product or the loss that may be
suﬀered in a mismatch, the higher the penalties that may be assessed without causing breakdown
the advice market to break down. Because ρA+ρF > m+m in Proposition 7, we already know that
this condition constrains the government’s welfare maximization problem (in (12)). The following
proposition characterizes the optimal law under this constraint.
Proposition 8. (Heeding Advice and Optimal Law) When the broker cannot impose his recom-





(kF − γm)(1 + γ) − 2γm(1 − γ)
￿





2kFγ(kF − γm) + 2γ2m2 − kFγm(1 + γ) − kAkF(1 − γ)
￿
+ (kA − γm)Q
o, (36)
ρ∗









kF(1 + γ)2 − 4γm
￿
− 4γ3m(kF − m)
o
. (38)
The agent’s penalty (ρ∗
A), is increasing in γ, while the ﬁrm’s penalty (ρ∗
F) is decreasing in γ.
An important implication of Proposition 8 is that insurance is the only way to protect consumers
in this market; that is, it is optimal to have ρA + ρF = m + m. Penalties that make consumers
whole can be assessed, but no punitive damages may be added. Given our discussion in previous
sections, this means that the ﬁrst-best scenario is not achievable in these markets. In other words,
when the advisor cannot act as a gate-keeper and customers must eﬀectively be persuaded to use
the agent’s advice, optimal quality and advice cannot be reached. This means that freedom in the
market leads to lower value creation, a striking result.
Figures 2 and 3 provide us with more insight into the equilibrium of Proposition 8. In these
ﬁgures, we plot various equilibrium quantities as functions of γ and m respectively. Consistent
with Proposition 8, we can see from Figures 2(a) and 2(b) that ρA is decreasing in γ, while ρF is
increasing in γ: more blame is put on the agent when his task of sorting customer becomes more
precise and thus easier. At the same time, more of the consumer surplus that is generated in the
market depends on advising as opposed to quality products. Indeed, as we can see from Figures
2(c) and 2(d), a increases with γ, while q decreases with γ. Interestingly, as we can see from Figures
2(e) and 2(f), this does not translate into monotonic relationships of nH and nL with γ. Instead, the
number of matched customers hits a minimum at γ ≈ 0.61. That is, more consumers are matched
with a product that is appropriate for them when γ is small or when it is large. In the former case,
this is because the ﬁrm produces more quality; in the latter case, this is because the advice channel
is reliable. As shown in Figure 2(g), this translates into a large legal system for intermediate values
of γ. Finally, let us deﬁne B to be the fraction of consumers who are made better oﬀ through
the advice channel. Because the ﬁrm’s choice of q implies that φ + (1 − φ)q customers would be
appropriately matched with a product if they picked one randomly, we have
B ≡
nH
φ + (1 − φ)q
− 1. (39)
Figure 2(h) plots this quantity as a function of γ. Clearly, because the broker advises more and
because he does so with more accuracy as γ goes up, the fraction of people that beneﬁt from the
advice channel increases at a faster rate than a and γ.
Figure 3 shows the same set of equilibrium quantities, but as a function of m. In these ﬁgures,
we set φ = 0.5, so that the restriction that φm+(1−φ)m = 0 implies that m = m. That is, as we






(a) ρA as a function of γ.






(b) ρF as a function of γ.





(c) a as a function of γ.




(d) q as a function of γ.




(e) nH as a function of γ.




(f) nL as a function of γ.




(g) nLρT as a function of γ.




(h) B as a function of γ.
Figure 2: These ﬁgures show equilibrium quantities as functions of γ, when the law is constrained
to satisfy ρA + ρF ≤ m + m. The parameters used for all ﬁgures are φ = 0.5, m = m = 1, kA = 2,
and kF = 3.
24increase m, it must be the case that m increases along with it. In essence therefore, the horizontal
axis in all these graphs measures the utility spread between a customer who is matched and one
who is mismatched. Indeed, when m and m are both small, customer cannot beneﬁt much from a
match, nor can they be hurt much from a mismatch. As m and m increase, the gain to a match and
the loss to a mismatch both increase at the same rate. Although the ﬁrm’s penalty (Figure 3(b))
and provision of quality (Figure 3(d)) increase as the stakes increase for consumers, this is not the
case for the agent’s penalty (Figure 3(a)) and advising intensity (Figure 3(c)). Instead, both of
these quantities peak for intermediate values of m. That is, the agent is not relied upon to create
consumer surplus when the stakes are small or when they are large. In fact, although we do not
plot this in Figure 3, it is the case that the fraction of the total payment received by mismatched
customers,
ρA
m+m, is monotonically decreasing in m. Thus, although the agent’s advice would be
welcome by consumers who have a lot to gain or lose, it is optimal for the legal system to ensure
a good matching process directly via the ﬁrm’s choice of quality. As we see from Figures 3(e)
and 3(f), this reliance on the ﬁrm is quite strong, as every consumer gets matched when m = 1.
As shown in Figure 3(g), the result is a legal system that is small with a small m (no point in
punishing since there is not much to lose) or a large m (the quality is such that every consumer
is matched, and so no lawsuits take place). Finally, Figure 3(h) shows that the biggest gains from
the advising process occur when the broker’s choice of a is large.
6 Concluding Remarks
Protecting consumers in ﬁnancial markets who are “unable to fend for themselves” is not only an
important duty of the law, but also an important driver of participation in the market and economic
growth. In this paper, we characterize the legal rules that maximize welfare in markets in which
producers of ﬁnancial markets outsource their advice services.
The model that we analyze is one of bilateral hidden action: ﬁrms choose the quality of the
goods they produce and brokers advise consumers when they make their purchases. Without the
law, neither party can commit to acting in the best interest of consumers, and little of the economic
surplus that markets can potentially generate is actually realized. With the law, the two parties
tend to free-ride on each other’s eﬀort provision: as the ﬁrm commits to higher quality, the broker
has a lower incentive to give advice, and vice versa. When ﬁnancial decisions are more complex
and matching consumers with products becomes more diﬃcult, both the ﬁrm and the broker add
less value in the market.
We show that the law not only makes wronged consumers whole, but provides them with






(a) ρA as a function of m.
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(f) nL as a function of m.







(g) nLρT as a function of m.






(h) B as a function of m.
Figure 3: These ﬁgures show equilibrium quantities as functions of m, when the law is constrained
to satisfy ρA + ρF ≤ m + m. The parameters used for all ﬁgures are φ = 0.5 (so that m = m),
γ = 0.5, kA = 2, and kF = 2.
26punitive damages. In fact, such a welfare-maximizing legal system achieves ﬁrst-best quality and
advice, whether the broker’s role is to advise clients about their participation in markets or to
assist them in choosing speciﬁc products. In addition, we show that the use of sales commissions in
compensation contracts causes a conﬂict of interest in which brokers tend to give less advice. The
law circumvents this problem by increasing penalties to brokers and decreasing penalties to ﬁrms
when customers are wronged in the market.
Given the large size of retail ﬁnancial markets and the recent economic impact of the subprime
mortgage crisis in the U.S., we feel that the analysis in this paper has signiﬁcant welfare import.
27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Deﬁne ˆ nH (ˆ nL) as the number of sales that would be directed toward high (low) type consumers if
q = 0. As such,




γ + (1 − γ)φ
￿o
+ (1 − a)φ = φ
￿




ˆ nL = a
￿
(1 − φ)(1 − γ)φ
￿




1 − φ(1 − γ)
￿o
.
Since nH = ˆ nH+qˆ nL and nL = (1−q)ˆ nL, we can compute the expressions in (4) and (5). Comparative
statics follow from straight diﬀerentiation. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
In a Nash equilibrium, the agent (the ﬁrm) correctly anticipates the ﬁrm’s (agent’s) choice of q
(a). Thus their equilibrium choice of a and q must solve (7) and (9). This yields (10) and (11).
Comparative statics follow from straight diﬀerentiation. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting ρA = 0 and ρF = 0 into (10) and (11), yields q∗ = 0 and a∗ = 0. From (12), welfare
may be expressed as







Since nH = φ and nL = 1−φ when a = 0 and q = 0, and φm−(1−φ)m = 0, we have W = 0 when
ρA = 0 and ρF = 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4
The problem in (12) is equivalent to
max
a,q







subject to (10) and (11). In fact, when ﬁrst-best is attainable, we can simply maximize (A1) with
respect to a and q, and ﬁnd the penalties ρA and ρF that make (10) and (11) equal to the ﬁrst-best
values of a of q. First-order conditions yield
a =
￿













Solving for a and q in these two equations yields (15) and (16). The expressions in (13) and (14)
result from equating (10) and (11) with (15) and (16), and solving for ρF and ρA. Comparative
statics follow from straight diﬀerentiation. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5










(1 − φ)(1 − aλ)ρF
kF
.
Direct substitution yields (18) and (19). Given the relationships in (20) and (21), and the fact that





Proof of Proposition 6
In a Nash equilibrium, the agent (the ﬁrm) correctly anticipates the ﬁrm’s (agent’s) choice of q (a).
Thus their equilibrium choice of a and q must solve (25) and (26). This leads to (27) and (28).
Simple but tedious diﬀerentiation of these two expressions with respect to ρA and ρF completes the
proof. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7
It is straightforward to verify, along the lines of the proof of Proposition 4, that ρ∗
A and ρ∗
F in (29)
and (30) are the penalties that make (27) and (28) equal to the ﬁrst-best values of a and q in (31)
and (32). Diﬀerentiation of ρ∗
A with respect to γ establishes the last result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8
The government seeks to solve
max
ρA,ρF







subject to (27), (28) and ρA + ρF ≤ m + m, where nH and nL are given by (23) and (24). Since we
know that ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved, it is never optimal for the government to set ρA and ρF
29such that ρA + ρF < m + m. As such, the third constraint must be satisﬁed with equality, that is,
ρA + ρF = m + m or, using (25) and (26),
akA





1 − a(γ + δ)
￿ = m + m. (A4)
Recall from Proposition 6 that a∗ in (27) is increasing in ρA and decreasing in ρF while q∗ in (28)
is increasing in ρF and decreasing in ρA. This implies that both ρA and ρF must be increased in
order to increase a∗ without aﬀecting q∗ or in order to increase q∗ without aﬀecting a∗. Thus the
government’s maximization problem is equivalent to
max







subject to a + q = t, where t solves (A4).
For any given t > 0, it is easy to show that the solution to this problem is given by q = A+Bt
and a = −A + (1 − B)t with
A =
(1 − γ)m




kA + kF − 2γm
.
Using these expressions in (A4) and manipulating yields a quadratic expression in t with a unique
positive root. We can use this root to get a = −A + (1 − B)t, insert the resulting expression for a
in (25), and solve for ρA. This yields (36). The solution for ρF in (37) comes from the constraint
that ρA + ρF = m + m. ￿
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